In Part I of this series [1], I described the way that government employees are being asked, in the name of Homeland Security Presidential Directive #12, to sign away their rights in order to keep their jobs (in essence). I should note that not all the blame for the problems are due to Homeland Security. Some are due to the way individual agencies are implementing the procedure. I should also note that the precise wording of the directive is not necessarily objectionable. Nevertheless, the requirement to sign a blanket waiver allowing an intrusive government investigation applies across the board and is the way in which the directive is being implemented.

In Part II [2] I describe an aspect of the procedure by which government employees are investigated as part of the imlpementation of Homeland Security Presidential Directive #12. This part of the procedure is called the "Suitability Matrix" and is not in iteself a part of the directive. From what I could tell, it was an existing procedure, used to determine if someone should be debarred from government work, that has been appropraited by the US Office of Personnel Management in order to implement the directive. The Suitability Matrix is objectionable because a.) it does not give the procedure by which it is used, b.) it seems to require an intrusive investigation into an employees personal life way beyond anything Homeland Security Presidential Directive #12 requires, and c.) it includes as "offenses" things that could easily be misused, such as a reference to "sodomy" that, in context, sounds suspiciously like it could be used to debar gays from government work.

To date, my wife has not yet gotten her email giving her 10 days to sign a blanket waiver to allow the government to investigate her, and to date she is not sure what she will do when the time comes. What follows is one person's response to the situation. Susan Foster worked for NASA's Jet Propulsion Lab in Pasadena, CA. for nearly 40 years. She is choosing to resign rather than sign the blanket waiver and this is her resignation letter. I quote it in full and verbatum because it strikes me as a pretty level headed response to what seems to be a symptom of national hysteria that we are experiencing in the name of "security." The following words are Susan Foster's:

Dear Gene,

Thank you for your email clarifying some of the issues around the rebadging activity. I still have several concerns, however; in fact, my concerns are such that I have informed my line management that I will retire effective November 1 because I cannot in good conscience participate in the rebadging process as it currently stands. I do understand that there is no one at JPL, Caltech, or NASA who has the authority to resolve these issues, and I do not fault the Director's Office or anyone here for complying with the requirements as handed down. However, I would like to explain some of my concerns.

First, let me clarify that not all of us who have questioned the rebadging process are opposed to HSPD-12 in itself; we have concerns about the implementation of HSPD-12, including the SF85 release form.

The process is, in my opinion, excessive for the purposes of implementing HSPD-12, which is designed to create a “Government -wide standard for secure and reliable forms of identification issued by the Federal Government to its employees and contractors (including contractor employees).” I tremble to think what it is costing the American taxpayers to do these investigative checks on long-time, valued, trusted employees who do not work on classified projects and who have not given anyone any reason to suspect they would undermine the security of the United States. That money could be better spent truly enhancing our country's security at federal facilities, airports, and ports. In fact, the 9/11 Commission report addresses this very issue:

Recommendation: Hard choices must be made in allocating limited resources. The U.S. government should identify and evaluate the transportation assets that need to be protected, set risk-based priorities for defending them, select the most practical and cost-effective ways of doing so, and then develop a plan, budget and funding to the implement the effort...” [page 391; emphasis mine]

When I received my OneNASA badge, most of my fingerprints were “rejected” by the machine but accepted by the person who was doing my fingerprinting. I expressed concern to her at the time, and I wish now that I had objected more strenuously by refusing to participate then until the equipment was reliable. I don't mind the government having my fingerprints (I think they already do from a security clearance in the '80s), but I want them to be accurate – to truly prove that I am who I say I am! This is not a rhetorical or hypothetical concern; I think Portland attorney Brandon Mayfield (who was falsely accused of the Madrid train bombing due to the FBI's analysis of a substandard set of prints) might have some additional insight on that issue. Has anything been done to improve the accuracy of the fingerprints being taken for the new ID badge?

I'm concerned about the radio frequency technology being used to store information on the new badge; specifically, I am concerned about who will be authorized to view it, and how accessible it will be to unauthorized viewers. I understand that RF identification can be accessed remotely without my knowing that it is being accessed, who is accessing the information, or why. I do know that overly exuberant security personnel as well as identity thieves are quite accomplised at accessing supposedly secure information; why would I want it hanging around my neck for all the world to “see”? Will employees have an opportunity to view the encoded data so that they are assured that social security numbers or other theft-attractive information are not included on the smart badge?

The lack of limits in the SF85 release on who can access my records and what records they can access is not, in my opinion, reasonable for a basic clearance or to prove that I am who I say I am. I have no objection to a basic background check, but I do think it is a violation of my civil liberties to be required to give open-ended permission to any federal agent to access my personal information – especially without any explanation about when they would do so or what would be done with that information. If the government thinks I pose a security risk, it can use the constitutional mechanisms in place to investigate me. If I were asking to do classified or secret work, I would willingly agree that the government scrutinize me more closely; but I have never done classified work, do not now do classified work, and do not ever want to do classified work.

In some cases, I don't think the answers to concerned employees' questions have been accurate or even entirely honest. We keep hearing that completing the forms is “voluntary,” for example; but HSPD-12 explicitly states that the requirement is mandatory. And I'm not clear what the lab is saying when you say signing the form is voluntary; the word “voluntary” has the connotation that the action is done willingly and without constraint. The consequence that I would lose my job if I didn't sign it suggests to me that signing the form is most definitiely mandatory.

Speaking of consequences, I do not believe the lab has made it clear what the consequences are of not completing the requireed paperwork (or becoming “badge eligible” as you state in your email) by October 27. Your email says that the person will be put on unpaid leave – but that, I would suspect, can't last forever. Will you be involuntarily terminating employees who do not participate? Will you consider it to be voluntary termination?

Mike Griffin said in the JPL town hall (if I'm remembering correctly) that HSPD-12 is based on a recommendation in the 9/11 Commission Report. If that specific recommendation is in the 9/11 report, I can't find it – and, believe me, I have looked! (If you know where it is, please send me the page number.) There is a recommendation regarding secure identification and national standards for birth certificates and drivers' licenses, but the emphasis is on immigration law and enforcement – not civil servants and government contractors. That recommendation further states ...Fraud in identification documents is no longer just a problem of theft. At many entry points to vulnerable facilities, including gates for boarding aircraft, sources of identification are the last opportunity to ensure that people are who they say they are and to check whether they are terrorists. ... [page 390]

I believe that the identification required (and which I happily provided) for the OneNASA badges sufficiently meets the recommendation to ensure that I am who I say I am and to verify that I am not a terrorist. Any additional investigation should be done based on a valid and reasonable suspicion that I am a threat to my country – not on a global premise that any one of us might be a terrorist. As an aside – is every delivery person and service provider going to have these badges and the accompanying investigative background check? Will the terrorist actually arrive at JPL in an Arrowhead or FedEx or U-Haul truck and be waved through the gates after a cursory paperwork review?

Administrator Griffin's comment that everything will be fine if we just tell the truth sends chills down my spine – in part because I so well remember the McCarthy era, and in part because a day rarely passes that we don't read about how information entrusted to the government has been lost, stolen, misused or otherwise compromised. Is Mr. Griffin so naïve as to believe that our telling the truth will make everything fine? Frankly, I think we have valid reasons to be concerned that the government may not adequately secure and protect our information. The events even in my own life time have certainly suggested that we cannot always trust the government to protect our information or our civil liberties! (When I was a young woman, I was detained entering the United States at Port Huron. It's a rather long story, but just let me say that on that dark and stormy night – yes, it really was a dark and stormy night! -- I learned how fragile and precious our civil liberties are, and how easily we can lose them to the over-enthusiasm or incompetence of a government agency.)

The statement that “working for NASA is a privilege and not a right” is a bit of a red herring, in my opinion. First of all, I don't believe anyone has said that we have the “right” to work for NASA or JPL; people have expressed concern about constitutional rights, not employment “rights.” Second, while emotionally I feel very privileged (and grateful) to have worked for JPL for 39 years, I do not view my employment as a “privilege” but rather as a business arrangment with the California Institute of Technology. I give Caltech my dedicated and conscientious service, and Caltech pays me a salary and benefit package that Caltech has determined to be fair compensation for the service I provide. “Privilege” implies that our jobs at JPL and the relationship we have with NASA are unidirectional benefits to the employees, and I do not agree that is the case; Caltech/JPL and NASA benefit from the effforts of their employees, and the employees benefit through fairly negotiated compensation and benefits. This may sound like hair-splitting, but accuracy in the language in this situation is critical to inspiring trust.

I'd like to share some 9/11 Commission recommendations that I think may have been left on the cutting room floor:

Recommendation: The U.S. Government must define what the message [to the world] is, what it stands for. We should offer an example of moral leadership in the world, committed to treat people humanely, abide by the rule of law, and be generous and caring to our [Muslim] neighbors. ... [page 376]

Recommendation: As the President determines the guidelines for information sharing among government agencies and by those agencies with the private sector, he should safeguard the privacy of individuals about whom information is shared. [page 394]

Recommendation: The burden of proof for retaining a particular governmental power should be on the executive, to explain (a) that the power actually materially enhances security and (b) that there is adequate supervision of the executive's use of the powers to ensure protection of civil liberties. If the power is granted [by Congress], there must be adequate guidelines and oversight to properly confine its use. [page 394, following the discussion that says in part, “Because of concerns regarding the shifting balance of power to the government, we think that a full and informed debate on the Patriot Act would be healthy.”]

Recommendation: At this time of increased and consolidated government authority, there should be a board within the executive branch to oversee adherence to the guidelines we recommend and the commitment the government makes to defend our civil liberties. [page 395]

At a time in our history when American citizens are being held for years in prisons without charges, when the Attorney General of the United States is challenging the very existence of U.S. citizens' right to habeas corpus, when the government is authorizing and defending warrantless wiretapping, it behooves each of us to be vigilant about protecting the civil liberties established in the U.S. Constitution. I don't expect other people to take my stand; I respect those who have a different point of view or who feel they have no choice because they need to feed and educate their children and pay their mortgages. But I cannot participate in this activity that I see as part of increasing assault on American values and liberties. If we have come to a place in our history where our civil liberties have no value to our government, then perhaps the terrorists have already won.

Please accept my heartfelt best wishes for a rightful outcome to all this. I am hopeful, but not optimistic, that Congress wil work with the secretary of commerce to come to a more reasonable (and cost-effective) solution or that the courts will agree that our concerns are valid.

Kind regards,

Susan Foster

This ends my planned coverage of NASA's experience with Homeland Security Presidential Directive #12. I am getting lots of input. I would be happy to add more points of view to this coverage if anyone is interested. There are other agencies having problems and I am sure there are those who are involved in the implementation of the directive who are doing their best to balance security and liberties. I also know that this diary is being discussed by people whose job it is to defend civil liberties and by people connected with various Congressional Reps. I welcome any of these points of view should anyone wish to email me.

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